University of Massachusetts School of Law

Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law
Faculty Publications

2017

Carpenter Privacy Case Vexes Justices, While Tech
Giant Microsoft Battles Government in Second
U.S. Supreme Court Privacy Case with
International Implications
Richard J. Peltz-Steele
University of Massachusetts School of Law - Dartmouth, rpeltzsteele@umassd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, International Law
Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Richard J. Peltz-Steele, Carpenter Privacy Case Vexes Justices, While Tech Giant Microsoft Battles Government in Second U.S. Supreme Court
Privacy Case with International Implications, Int'l L., Privacy, Cybersecurity & Digital Rts Committee Q. Newsl. (Am. Bar Ass'n), Winter
2017.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law.

Carpenter privacy case vexes justices, while tech giant Microsoft battles Government in
second U.S. Supreme Court privacy case with international implications
By Richard J. Peltz-Steele
Last quarter’s committee news reported the first of two major privacy cases with
international implications to reach the U.S. Supreme Court this term, Carpenter v. United
States.1 Now a second such case pits the Government against Big Tech in United States v.
Microsoft.2
Carpenter v. United States. Carpenter is a criminal case involving federal seizure of
cell phone location data from service providers. Arising under the “reasonable grounds”
provision of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 3 the case accentuates Americans’ lack of
constitutional protection for personal data in third-party hands, in contrast with emerging global
privacy norms.
In oral argument in November, the Government positioned itself squarely within the thirdparty doctrine. Justice Kagan pushed back, finding analogy in United States v. Jones.4 In
Jones in 2012, the Court held unanimously that law enforcement violated the Fourth
Amendment by surreptitiously attaching a GPS tracker to a suspect’s car. The Government
sought to distinguish Jones as involving (literally) hands-on intrusion.
Just as she expressed misgivings about the third-party doctrine in her Jones
concurrence, Sotomayor raised the alarm about waning informational privacy in the digital age.
She suggested that the Court might carve out an exception to the doctrine, as it has for medical
records. Justice Breyer seemed receptive to the comparison; Justice Alito did not. Chief
Justice Roberts seemed to search for a middle ground, wanting to connect the dots from cell
phone content—which requires a search warrant—to location data.
In sum the Court majority seemed ill disposed to discard the third-party doctrine and
invigorate privacy in constitutional law. The takeaway from Carpenter is likely to be that
Congress still holds the key to bringing U.S. search and seizure into accord with European data
protection.
United States v. Microsoft. The second major privacy case headed for Supreme Court
decision in 2018 also arises under the SCA, involves criminal investigation and new technology,
and implicates collision between the third-party doctrine and European privacy law. In United
States v. Microsoft, however, the implications for international law loom larger.
In Microsoft, federal law enforcement officers in a narcotics investigation obtained a
probable-cause warrant for the content of a Microsoft user’s email. The user’s identity,
residence, and nationality are not in the public record. What is known is that the user’s email
resides in Ireland. Microsoft maintains only one virtual “copy” of a user’s email (with some
immaterial exceptions), usually geographically near the user or where the user purports to be.
Carpenter and Microsoft implicate different subdivisions of SCA § 2703. Carpenter
involves a court order predicated only upon reasonableness, ostensibly meant to compel
production of information about a user. Microsoft involves a court-sanctioned warrant
predicated upon probable cause to compel production of information of a user. When the
Government wants to look inside email messages, the SCA ups the stakes, more or less
analogizing to a postal package.
Microsoft surrendered metadata stored on servers in the United States, but moved to
quash the warrant for email contents stored on servers in Dublin. Microsoft asserted that the
SCA does not authorize compelled production outside the United States. The Government
retorted that production is not extra-territorial if data can be summoned from a terminal in
Redmond, Washington, without anyone in Dublin lifting a finger. The Second Circuit ruled for
Microsoft, citing the canon of presumption against extraterritoriality, and an equally divided
bench denied rehearing en banc with dissents.
The Court heard oral argument in February. According to analysis by Amy Howe for
SCOTUSblog, the court was divided. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were skeptical that
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Microsoft’s choice to place data overseas should control the government’s reach. Justices
Ginsburg, Gorsuch, and Sotomayor seemed more sensitive to the impact of overseas reach on
international comity. Justice Breyer seemed in search of a case-by-case middle ground, of
which Microsoft counsel wanted no part.
In a lucid concurring opinion in the Second Circuit, below, Judge Lynch posited that the
case perhaps should turn on a fact we do not have: the user’s nationality. It matters, he
reasoned, whether the case is about an American warrant for an Irish national’s email, located
in Ireland, held by an American company selling services to Irish users, or about an American
warrant for an American’s email located in Ireland only because the American misrepresented
residence.
Nevertheless, Judge Lynch concluded that the key to resolving conflict between
international law enforcement and comity rests, again, with Congress.
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